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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LANV-ZONING

FoR

SINGLE-"FAMILY" DWELLINGS

Is NOT DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION TO UNRELATED PERSONSVillage of Belle Terre v. Boraas,416 U.S. 1 (1974).
Six unrelated persons resided in a single dwelling in Belle Terre,
New York, in violation of the Village's zoning ordinance. The village
is zoned exclusively for one-family dwellings; "family" is defined by
the ordinance as:'
One or more persons related by blood, adoption or marriage, living
and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit [or] a number of
persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a
single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or
marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family.
The lessors of the residence were served with notice that failure of
2
their tenants to disband would subject the lessors to criminal liability.
They and the three members of the Boraas household commenced
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal district court claiming
that the Belle Terre ordinance unconstitutionally infringed their rights
of travel, privacy and association. The district court upheld the ordinance on the ground that the preservation of the traditional family
character in a community is a proper zoning consideration. 3 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 4 On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the circuit court in a 7-2 decision. Held: The Belle Terre ordinance did not abridge any fundamental interest and is within the class of economic and social legislation that is upheld if it is "reasonable" and bears "a rational relationship to a [permissible] state objective. ' 5 Applying this test, the

1. BELLE TERRE, N.Y., ZONING CODE art. I, § D-1.35a (1970).
2. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1973). Liability
under the Code constitutes a penalty not to exceed $100.00 or imprisonment for a
period not to exceed 60 days or both. A separate and distinct offense is deemed committed each day a violation occurs. BELLE TERRE, N.Y., ZONING CODE art. VIII, Part 4,
§ M-l.4a(2) (1971).
3. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 367 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. N.Y. 1972).
4. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973).
5. 416 U.S. at 8. Justice Brennan dissented on two grounds: (1) there was no
case or controversy presented by the tenants since they had moved out of the house
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majority reasoned that the ordinance constituted valid land use legislation reasonably designed to maintain traditional family patterns.
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
Three aspects of Boraas are worthy of discussion: (1) The equal
protection test applied; (2) whether Boraas was decided correctly
under that test; and (3) the effect of the decision on equal protection
litigation and on zoning. It is submitted that the Court upheld the
Belle Terre ordinance without a thorough analysis. Although it would
have been preferable for the Court to adopt the "balance-of-interests"
formula advanced by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, or
at least reveal the shortcomings of such an approach, Boraas should
have been decided differently even under the Court's two-tiered approach. The Court should have found that a fundamental interest was
involved and subjected the ordinance to strict scrutiny. In the alternative, no rational relationship should have been found between the
Belle Terre ordinance and permissible zoning objectives.
I.

EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS

The Warren Court developed a "two-tiered" formula by which legislation challenged as violative of the equal protection clause is examined. 6 Briefly, if the personal interest affected by the legislation is
"fundamental, ' 7 or the classification is "suspect," 8 the "strict" scrutiny
test is applied; the classification is upheld only if the state shows a

and no longer had an interest to be vindicated by invalidation of the ordinance; and
(2) lessors were unable to assert the alleged denial of lessee's constitutional rights.
Id. at 10-12.

Justice Marshall, in a separate opinion, dissented because he believed the ordinance
burdened the lessee's fundamental rights of association and privacy. Thus, he would
have applied strict equal protection scrutiny rather than the practical relationship,
minimal scrutiny applied by the majority. Id. at 13.

6. For an extensive examination of the two-tiered formula see Note, Developments-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
7. These include the right to vote, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972):
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), to procreate, Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), and to travel interstate. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Some fundamental interests
have developed outside the sphere of equal protection litigation, e.g., the right of privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), and freedom of association. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
8. "Suspect" classifications are those based on race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967), alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). and nationality.
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
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compelling governmental interest 9 to justify its legislation. If the
statute does not contain a suspect class or impinge upon a fundamental interest, the more relaxed "rational basis" test is applied, and
the classification is upheld if "any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it."1O
The Warren Court's two-tiered system was an analytical shortcut.
Scrutiny that was "strict" in theory was nearly always "fatal in fact";
the legislation under review seldom survived strict scrutiny." On the

other hand, scrutiny that was minimal in theory was "virtually none in
fact"; 12 a rational basis was nearly always found for legislation re13
viewed under this test.
There are recent indications, however, that the Court, dissatisfied
with the extremes inherent in the two-tiered formula,' 4 is inclining

9. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
10. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
11. In only two instances has legislation survived strict scrutiny and then only
during wartime. In Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Court
upheld a military order during World War II excluding persons of Japanese lineage
from remaining in particular military areas. The court held that a compelling state
interest in national defense justified the legislation which authorized the order. In
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), the court held a compelling state
interest in national defense sufficient to uphold a curfew order directed only at persons of Japanese lineage under the same legislation as in Korematsu.
12. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
13. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
Imaginations can often be stretched to find a rational basis. Under this test, in a
pre-Warren Court case, the Court upheld a statute on the ground that nepotism in
selection of river pilots could be intended to promote public safety. Kotch v. Board
of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). This case was cited with approval
in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426-27 (1961), where the Court upheld
a Sunday blue law which permitted the sale of tobacco, confectionaries, milk, bread,
fruits, gasoline, oils, greases, drugs and medicine but prohibited the sale of all other
commodities including "a three-ring loose-leaf binder, a can of floor wax, a stapler
and staples and a toy submarine." Id. at 422.
14. For example, the Justices are unable to agree on the proper standard for determining whether an interest should be deemed fundamental. Justice Powell has
stated: "the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right . . . explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). Justice Marshall, however, disagrees: "I would like to
know where the Constitution guarantees the right to procreate . .. or the right to
vote in state elections ... or the right to an appeal from a criminal conviction ......
Id. at 100 (dissenting). Justice Rehnquist feels that leaving to "this Court the determination of what are, and what are not, 'fundamental personal rights'. . . can only
be described as a judicial superstructure, awkwardly engrafted upon the Constitution
itself." Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 179 (1972) (dissenting). In
Justice Burger's opinion, the articulation of suspect classification "tends to stop analysis
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toward the use of a "balance-of-interests" or "sliding-scale" test. 1 5
Under such a test the particular personal interest affected is weighed
against the social interest the state seeks to protect. Without acknowledging a departure from its two-tiered formula, the Court has followed such an intermediate approach.' 6 For example, in Weber v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 17 the Court held unconstitutional a

Louisiana statute limiting the rights of unacknowledged illegitimate
children to recover under workmen's compensation laws. After stating
that a statute must at least bear some rational relationship to a legiti18
mate state purpose, the Court reasoned:
Though the latitude given state economic and social regulation is necessarily broad, when state statutory classifications approach sensitive
and fundamental personal rights, this Court exercises a stricter scrutiny
...

. The essential inquiry in all .

.

. cases is, however, inevitably a

dual one: What legitimate state interest does the classification
promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification
endanger?

while appearing to suggest an analytical process." In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 730
(1973) (dissenting).
Commentators have also been less than satisfied with the two-tiered formula. See,
e.g., Note, Developments-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1123-24 (1969);
Gunther, note 12 supra, at 17-18; Note, On Privacy, Constitutional Protection for
PersonalLiberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 670, 702 (1973).
15. See Gunther, note 12 supra. The "balance-of-interests" test is formulated in
Justice Marshall's dissent in Rodriguez:
As the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed
on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted accordingly . . . . This is the real
lesson that must be taken from our previous decisions involving interests deemed
to be fundamental.
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102-03 (1973). See Dunn v.
Blumstein. 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471. 520-21
(1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164.
172-73(1972).
16. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Skinner, 94 S. Ct. 740 (1974); United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill. 411
U.S. 619 (1973); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana. 406
U.S. 715 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Schilb v. Kuebel.
404 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1971), Justice Blackmun outlines some of the different minimal scrutiny standards which have been used.
17. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
18. Id. at 172-73 (emphasis added).

424

Zoning
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Boraas interpreted
Weber and other Supreme Court decisions 19 as an indication of a new
20
equal protection test:
[T] he court is required to determine whether the legislative classification in fact (rather than hypothetically) has a substantial relationship
to a lawful objective. That determination of necessity requires the
court to consider evidence of the nature of the classification under attack, the rights adversely affected and the governmental interest in
support of it.
When the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in Boraas, one
might have assumed that it would clarify2 ' its current use of equal
protection standards. Justice Douglas, however, writing for the majority, did not discuss the alternative methods for examining an equal
protection problem. He simply stated that the Belle Terre ordinance
involved no fundamental right but was typical of economic and social
legislation which is upheld if it is reasonably related to a permissible
state objective.2 2 Moreover, he did not specify how the ordinance furthered permissible objectives.
The Court's treatment of the equal protection claim suggests two
conclusions: (1) Whatever other indications there may be, the twotiered formula has not yet been dethroned by a "balance-of-interests"
test; and (2) an explanation of why certain decisions seem to deviate

19. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971);
James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).

20.

476 F.2d at 815 n.8 (court's emphasis). This formula was used by Justice

Marshall in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972), although he did not dis-

cuss the "in fact" relationship. The "hypothetical conception" to which the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit referred developed from Chief Justice Warren's
definition of "minimal scrutiny" in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26
(1961): "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts may be
conceived to justify it."
Judge Timbers dissented in the Second Circuit's opinion not because he felt the
Court was adhering to the "two-tiered" formula, but because he felt recent decisions
of the Supreme Court indicated that the test should be whether the classification under
review is "grossly overinclusive or underinclusive." 476 F.2d at 821.
21. The lower courts, as may be expected, have demonstrated confusion over the
proper application of the equal protection doctrine. See, e.g., Aguayo v. Richardson,
473 F.2d 1090, 1109 (2d Cir. 1973); Lawrence v. Oakes, 361 F. Supp. 432, 440
(D. Vt. 1973); Henry v. White, 359 F. Supp. 969, 972 (D. Conn. 1973).
22. 416 U.S. at 7-8.
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from this formula may not be forthcoming-for it is difficult to con23
ceive of an appellate court opinion more worthy of such comment.

A.

Rational Basis
Declining to recognize that the Belle Terre ordinance infringed on

any fundamental interest, the Court applied the test of minimal scrutiny:

24

We deal with economic and social legislation where legislatures have
historically drawn lines which we respect against the charge of violation of the Equal Protection Clause if the law be "reasonable, not arbitrary" . . . and bears "a rational relationship to a [permissible] state
objective."

The Court upheld the ordinance, finding that it bore a rational relationship to the Village's zoning interests which were assumed to include the protection and maintenance of family needs and family
values. 25 This holding is questionable on two grounds: (1) The finding
of a rational relationship between the ordinance and the Village's legitimate interests in zoning contradicted the factual findings of the district court; and (2) the Court legitimated a new objective which is not
a proper zoning concern.
1.

Traditionalzoning objectives

In finding that the Belle Terre ordinance bore a sufficient relationship to traditional zoning objectives (i.e., promotion of the general
welfare by controlling population density, rental rates, noise and
traffic), the Court observed: "The regimes of boarding houses, fraternity houses, and the like present urban problems. More people oc23. The Second Circuit's opinion contained an extensive analysis of recent
Supreme Court interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause. Boraas v. Village of
Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 812-29 (2d Cir. 1973). And, although Judge Timbers
dissented, he agreed with the two-judge majority that the Supreme Court is abandoning the two-tiered formula. Id. at 821. After Boraas, lower courts will no doubt continue to scrutinize and attempt to comprehend Supreme Court opinions, continue to
write detailed equal protection analyses and continue to find their decisions cursorily
reversed after relying on Supreme Court opinions which "seem drawn more as efforts
to shield rather than to reveal the true basis of the Court's decisions." San Antonio
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1.110 (1973) (Marshall, J . dissenting).
24. 416 U.S. at 8.
25. Id. at 9.
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cupy a given space; more cars rather continuously pass by; more cars
are parked; noise travels with crowds." 2 6 While population density
and noise and traffic problems may be legitimate zoning concerns,
they are, in Justice Douglas' words, created by "boarding houses, fraternity houses, and the like." Yet, a boarding or fraternity house is not
necessarily "like" a household of three unrelated persons. 27 Indeed,
boarding and fraternity houses were specifically excluded by the Belle
Terre ordinance. 28 Obviously, the Belle Terre zoning officials did not
consider the two equivalent when they enacted the ordinance. If a
boarding or fraternity house and an "unrelated" household are sufficiently alike, there would have been no need for two separate exclusions.
There was no convincing evidence produced at the trial level to
show that groups of three or four unrelated persons tend to produce
these effects any more than do families related by blood, adoption or
marriage. 29 The ordinance places restrictions on three unrelated individuals although that number is smaller than the average size household in Belle Terre. 30 Moreover, a group of students, for example,

26. Id.
27. While 8 or 10 unrelated persons living together may be approaching "boarding
house" dimensions, the similarity ceases long before the number approaches "two."
One case which seems to support the Boraas decision is Palo Alto Tenants Union v.
Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970), in which an ordinance defined "family"
as no more than "four" unrelated individuals. However, one reason Judge Wollenberg
found the limitation inoffensive was that "the average size of even the traditional
family is less than four members." Id. at 912. Furthermore, in Gabe Collins Realty,
Inc., v. City of Margate City, 112 NJ. Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1970),
it was held that a limitation to "two" unrelated persons was not a "significant
amelioration" of the unreasonableness of totally excluding unrelated households.
The Boraas majority stated that line drawing is within the discretion of the legislature. 416 U.S. at 8. Yet, by invalidating the statute in United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), see text accompanying notes 36-40 infra, and
upholding the Belle Terre ordinance, the Court has drawn the line between the
numbers "two" and "three." While two unrelated individuals have a constitutional
right to live together, three do not.
28. BELLE TERRE, N.Y. ZONING CODE art. I, § D-1.34a(1971).
29. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 816 (2d Cir. 1973). See
Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 367 F. Supp. 136, 146 (E.D. N.Y. 1972):
Such a restricted zoning district might well be all but impossible to justify if it
had to be strictly justified by its service of such familiar zoning objectives as
safety, adequate light and air, preservation of the land from overintensive use,
avoiding crowding of the population, reduction of traffic congestion and facilitation of adequate transportation, water, sewerage, school, park and other public
services.
30. The average size household is just above three per household (3.18). See
416 U.S. at 19 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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may own only bicycles3 1 while a family with teenagers may own three
or four automobiles. But the ordinance places no numerical restriction
on "related" households, no matter how distant their relationship, even
though such households often have two or three wage-earners and
32
three or four cars.
The unreasonableness of the Belle Terre ordinance is also demonstrated by the availability of alternative means by which a local government can directly and more efficiently control population density,
noise and traffic problems. : 3 For example, the Village's ordinance itself,
which prohibits boarding and fraternity houses, would accomplish the
city's legitimate objectives of controlling the neighborhood population
and concomitant noise and traffic problems. 34 Thus, there is no need
for an additional restriction on unrelated households. As stated by
3
Judge Mansfield for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: 5
[Population control] could be achieved more rationally and without
discrimination against unrelated groups by regulation of the number
of bedrooms in a dwelling structure, by restriction of the ratio of persons to bedrooms, or simply by limitation of occupancy to a single
housekeeping unit. Public and private nuisance laws should provide an
adequate remedy to curb noise or other forms of pollution on the part
of occupants of a dwelling, regardless of their relationship to each
other.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's conclusion in Boraas is inconsistent
with its recent decision in United States Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno36 in which the Court invalidated an amendment to the Food
31. Justice Marshall found the ordinance overinclusive for including such groups
of students. Id.
32. For these reasons. Justice Marshall labeled the ordinance underinclusive.
I.
33. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 816-17 (2d Cir. 1973).
34. " [T] he criterion that the occupying group constitute a bona fide single housekeeping unit . . . might . . .effectively curtail occupancy by those unrelated groups
whose use is essentially of a dormitory or rooming house character ....-Gabe Collins Realty. Inc. v. City of Margate City. 112 N.J. Super. 341. 271 A.2d 430. 43i
(App. Div. 1970) (court's emphasis).
35. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 817 (2d Cir. 1973). Judge
Mansfield went on to state:
If the objective of the ordinance were to avoid rent inflation, the simple remedy
would be adoption of rent controls rather than the exclusion of a class of people
from the community .... If a problem of excessive automobiles existed, it could
be met simply by restricting the number of cars per dwelling unit, regardless of
the relationship of its occupants.
Id.
36. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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Stamp Act of 1964 which excluded from participation in the food
stamp program any household containing an individual unrelated to
any other member of the household. The government argued that
such a requirement was necessary to prevent fraud and abuse. Justice
37
Brennan, however, writing for the majority, stated:
But even if we were to accept as rational the Government's wholly
unsubstantiated assumptions concerning the differences between "related" and "unrelated" households, we still could not agree with the
Government's conclusion that the denial of essential federal food assistance to all otherwise eligible households containing unrelated
members constitutes a rational effort to deal with these concerns.
Justice Douglas concurred because he believed that the amendment
infringed the participants' freedom of association. 3 8 In Boraas, however, he distinguished Moreno because the Food Stamp Act prohibited
a household of two unrelated persons from receiving assistance
whereas Belle Terre permitted two unrelated persons to reside together. 39 The basis for the distinction apparently lies in the fact that
unmarried couples could live together under one restriction but not
under the other. Writing for the majority in Boraas, however, Justice
Douglas gave no reason why three unrelated persons necessarily
cherish their right to associate and to live together any less than do
40
two unrelated persons.
In short, whether members of a household are related or unrelated
has no bearing on a household's propensity for fraud or abuse in the
food stamp program. Similarly, relatedness has no bearing on population density or noise and traffic problems. There is no rational relationship between the city's legitimate interest in reducing population
density or noise and traffic problems and legislation restricting to
three the number of unrelated individuals who may live together.
2.

The recognition of a new zoning objective

As noted, the district court in Boraas upheld the Belle Terre ordinance on the sole ground that the protection and maintenance of the
37.
38.
39.
40.

413 U.S. at 535-36 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 541-45 (Douglas, J., concurring).
416 U.S. at 8 & n.6.
See text accompanying notes 64-77 infra,discussing the right of privacy.
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traditional family pattern is a legitimate zoning objective. The majority of the Court implicitly approved the district court's conclusion.
4
stating: '
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles
restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land use project addressed to
family needs....

The police power is not confined to elimination of

filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where
family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and
clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.
The Supreme Court's approval of "family needs" and "family values" as legitimate governmental objectives is directly contrary to the
42
Court's decision in New Jersey Welfare Rights Organizationv. Cahill,
and raises the question whether the Court holds the word "'zoning" in
special reverence. In Cahill the Court held, per curiam, that a New Jersey welfare program which denied benefits to a family with illegitimate
children violates the equal protection clause. The district court had
upheld the statute on the ground that it was designed to preserve and
strengthen family life. 4 3 The Supreme Court refused, however, to rec-

ognize the preservation of the general family lifestyle in Cahill as a
legitimate government concern, 44 but reversed itself sub silentio in
Boraaswhen zoning was involved.
If the restriction in Cahill was in pursuit of an impermissible objective, one may question why the Court approved "family needs" and
"family values" as legitimate objectives in Boraas. Is it merely because
Boraas involved zoning? To conclude that judicial deference is the
appropriate standard of review merely because zoning is involvedwithout a complete examination of the interests affected and the relevancy of the classification to the legitimate state purpose-is blind
legalism. Whatever the approach, "deference does not mean abdication."' 45 Although a "State cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels," 46 the use of the zoning label seems to
have accomplished just that.
41. 416 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added). This statement represents approval of the
sole ground upon which the district court upheld the Belle Terre ordinance: the protection and maintenance of the traditional family pattern in a community.
42. 411 U.S. 619(1973).
43. New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill. 349 F. Supp. 491. 496 (D. N.J.
1972).
44. 411 U.S. at 620-21.
45. 416 U.S. at 14.
46. NAACP v. Button. 371 U.S. 415. 429 (1963).
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But Boraas represents more than a misapplication of the rational
basis test; it places limitations on specific fundamental interests and
creates problems by recognizing family needs and family values as legitimate zoning objectives.
B.

PossibleFundamental Interests

Under either the two-tiered or balance-of-interests formula, legislation affecting a fundamental interest should be subjected to strict scrutiny. 47 Three fundamental interests were arguably affected by Belle
Terre's ordinance: the right to travel, 4 8 the right of association 49 and
the right of privacy.5 0 While the Court found none of these interests
present in Boraas, the constitutional issues presented deserved more
than the cursory treatment they received.
1.

Right to travel

The Belle Terre ordinance was challenged on the ground that it interfered with a person's right to travel because it discouraged new residents from settling in the Village. The Court declined to hold that the
right to travel was unconstitutionally infringed because the restriction
on unrelated households was not aimed specifically at transients but
was applied to longtime residents as well as recent arrivals.5 1 Thus,
the effect of the Belle Terre ordinance on the right to travel was
merely incidental, and the Court properly held that strict scrutiny was
52
inappropriate in this context.
47. It is undisputed that strict scrutiny is required under the two-tiered formula
when legislation affects a fundamental interest. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969). This requirement is unmodified by the balance of interests formula.
See Gunther, note 12 supra, at 24. After Justice Marshall recited his balance-ofinterests test in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972), he stated that the

State must show a "compelling reason" for its infringement on the fundamental rights
to vote and travel.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
416 U.S. at 7.

52. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the leading case recognizing a
right to travel, the legislation in question applied only to transients. Other cases concerning the right to travel concerned similar legislation. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp.

v. Maricopa County. 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (residency requirement before receiving non-

emergency hospitalization at county's expense impinged on right of travel); Dunn v.

Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (residency requirement for voting). But cf. King v.
New Rochelle Municipal Housing Auth'y, 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir. 1971); Cole v.
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Freedom of association

The Court rejected the argument 53 that the Belle Terre ordinance
encroached on unrelated persons' right of association, stating: "The
ordinance places no ban on other forms of association, for a 'family'
may, so far as the ordinance is concerned, entertain whomever it
likes."5 4 The Court's rationale, however, is unclear.
The Court's statement may indicate that one's freedom to associate
with whomever one chooses is not violated if that freedom is merely
restricted rather than totally denied; in Belle Terre, two unrelated persons may entertain whomever they please although three such persons
may not legally reside together. If this interpretation were correct,
however, the efficacy of strict scrutiny of legislation affecting fundamental interests would be severely attenuated. The Court on many
occasions has invalidated legislation that merely discourages the exercise of a fundamental right. For example, in Shapiro v. Thompson,55
a Connecticut statute required a 1-year residency period before welfare assistance could be obtained. The statute was invalidated as an
unconstitutional infringement on the right to travel even though travel
into the state was merely discouraged, not prohibited. In NAACP v.
Alabama,56 the Court held that the state's scrutiny of NAACP membership lists impermissibly infringed on members' rights to associate
freely with others--even though the state's effort to obtain membership lists did not prohibit, but merely discouraged, NAACP members
from associating. In light of these and other cases,5 7 it is unlikely that
the Court intended to require an individual to show the total denial of
a fundamental right before strict scrutiny would be applied.

Housing Auth'y, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970). where the appellate courts held that
the right to travel prevents communities from "zoning out" undesirables.
53. In arguing before the Supreme Court, the members of the Boraas household
apparently abandoned their claim that the Belle Terre ordinance encroached on unrelated persons' freedom of association. But the Village argued that it did not, Brief
for Appellants at 16-18, and the Court's treatment of the issue is worthy of comment.
54. 416 U.S. at 9.
55. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
56. 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).
57. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). In Levy, the Court struck down a statute that denied
workmen's compensation benefits to illegitimate children. In Weber, the Court held
that the mere relegation of illegitimates to a less favorable recovery position under
the state's workmen's compensation laws was as unconstitutional as total denial.
406 U.S. at 169.
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The only other implication to be drawn from the Court's opinion is
that personal association, unlike political association, is not fundamental. 58 Because the right of political association occupies funda59
mental status, statutes impairing that right are strictly scrutinized.
The Belle Terre ordinance, however, was subjected only to minimal
scrutiny.
The Court's opinion contains a further refinement on the scope of
freedom of association. The Court found United States Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno60 not controlling because the prohibition there
ran against two, rather than three, unrelated individuals. 61 This distinction suggests that personal association involving the degree of
intimacy of two individuals warrants greater protection than the less
intimate association among three or more members of a household.
Of course, intimacy involves privacy 62 as well as association, and it
may be that a combination of the two is necessary to result in a funda63
mental interest when political association is not involved.

3.

Right of privacy

In dismissing the claim that the Belle Terre ordinance impinged on
unrelated persons' right of privacy, Justice Douglas wrote for the
Court: "[The record] involves no 'fundamental' right guaranteed by
the Constitution, such as... any rights of privacy .. -64 Despite this
cursory rejection, the constitutional issue is far from frivolous.
58. This distinction may have arisen because freedom of association is a first
amendment corollary of freedom of speech and press, freedoms which the court increasingly has held to be grounded on a political need for educated self-government.
See Comment, In Quest of a "Decent Society": Obscenity and the Burger Court,
49 WASH. L. REv. 89, 123-28 & n.175 (1973).

59. In United States v. Robel, 398 U.S. 258 (1967), for example, the Court
strictly scrutinized, and struck down, a statute which prohibited registered members
of Communist organizations from engaging in employment in any defense facility because it infringed upon their freedom to associate. See also NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958), where the Court strictly scrutinized the state's effort to obtain

NAACP membership lists.
60.
61.

413 U.S. 528 (1973).
416 U.S. at 8 & n.6. The argument presented was "that the Belle Terre ordi-

nance reeks with an animosity to unmarried couples who live together." Id. The
Court rejected this argument simply because the Belle Terre ordinance permits two

unmarried people to live together.
62. See text accompanying notes 69-77 infra.
63. "The freedom of association is often inextricably entwined with the constitutionally guaranteed right of privacy." 416 U.S. at 15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. 416 U.S. at 7.
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Griswold v. Connecticut65 and Roe v. Wade 66 firmly established
that the right of privacy is a constitutionally protected, fundamental
right even though it is not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution.
The Roe Court also affirmed that the right has some extention to activities related to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing and education. 67 A closer analysis than that
supplied by the Court in Boraas reveals that the right of privacy is
broad enough to encompass a person's decision to live with others.
Individuals live together for many different reasons-not only because of marriage or consanguinity. Students may congregate in pursuit of an educational environment; young lawyers or doctors may
wish to ally themselves in furtherance of their professions; the needy
may join forces against inflation and the high cost of living; or close
friends may seek nothing more than each other's companionship. In
short, the choice to live with others is a highly complex and personal
68
decision. As Justice Marshall suggested in Boraas:
The choice of household companions-of whether a person's "intellectual and emotional needs" are best met by living with family,
friends, professional associates or others-involves deeply personal
considerations as to the kind and quality of intimate relationships
within the home. That decision surely falls within the ambit of the
right to privacy protected by the Constitution.
Members of a household may share chores and bills, eat together,
sleep together and generally share a day-to-day personal relationship.
Although not involving bodily privacy, such as a decision to use contraceptives 69 or have an abortion,7 0 the decision to live with whomever one chooses is no less private. The government has as little interest in dictating who will live with whom as it does in "telling a man,
sitting alone in his house, what books he may read or what films he
72
may watch. 7 1 As Justice Marshall appropriately noted:
65. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (statutes prohibiting the use of contraceptives violate
the right of privacy).
66. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (statutes prohibiting abortions in the first tripartite of a
woman's pregnancy violate the right of privacy).
67. Id. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
68. 416 U.S. at 16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
70. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
71. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). See Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66-67 (1973).
72. 416 U.S. at 15 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Although the Court did not address
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Zoning authorities cannot validly consider who household members
are, what they believe, or how they choose to live, whether they are
Negro or white, Catholic or Jew, Republican or Democrat, married or
unmarried.
The only consideration of zoning authorities should be land use; the
consanguineous status of household members is as irrelevant to land
use as whether those members use contraceptives or obtain abortions.
Although zoning authorities are granted "considerable latitude" in
drafting ordinances, the Court "has an obligation to ensure that
zoning ordinances, even when adopted in furtherance of.. . legiti'73
mate aims, do not infringe fundamental constitutional rights.
The Belle Terre ordinance could not have withstood strict scrutiny
if the Court had determined that the right of privacy was involved. As
noted earlier, it is doubtful that the ordinance furthers its purported
objectives;74 moreover, the classification is grossly over- and underinclusive.75 These shortcomings are amplified by the fact that there
are other less intrusive means7 6 of furthering the government's objectives. When such means are available, legislation affecting a funda77
mental interest cannot stand.
II.

THE IMPACT OF BORAAS

The Court in Boraas failed to examine the ramifications of legitimizing the Village's concern for traditional family patterns as a permissible zoning objective. Since 1926 zoning ordinances have been upheld
only if they bore a "substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare."'78 Many courts have struck down ordithe issue, strict enforcement of the Belle Terre ordinance would seem to necessitate
the use of constitutionally questionable tactics such as house-to-house searches. The

court's distaste for searches in pursuit of "tell-tale signs of contraceptives" contributed
to its conclusion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and it is unclear
why searches to ascertain personal relationships will not be equally reprehensible.

73.

416 U.S. at 14 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

74.

See text accompanying notes 29-32 supra.

75.

See notes 31 & 32 & accompanying text supra.

76.
77.

See note 33 & text accompanying note 34 supra.
See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972), in which the Court said:

And if there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of
greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose "less drastic means." Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
78. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
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nances similar to Belle Terre's on the belief that one segment of the
citizenry cannot be excluded in an attempt to further the general welfare.7 9 As the district court noted in Boraas, preserving the family
atmosphere as a zoning objective has the effect of permitting existing
inhabitants to compel all others who would take up residence in the
community to conform to its prevailing ideas of lifestyle. 80 The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that such an objective was not
within the proper exercise of state police power. 81 Zoning was created
as a means to regulate land use, not as a prophylactic control over
82
human behavior.
In light of the doubts expressed by the lower courts, one would
have expected the Supreme Court to have considered the possible consequences of recognizing this new zoning objective. The Supreme
Court should haye considered the ramifications of one class of citizens
excluding another. The appellate court in Boraas properly feared the
83
exercise of exclusionary zoning pursuant to ordinances which would:
restrict occupants to those having no more than two children per family, those employed within a given radius, those earning a minimum
79. See, e.g., Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan. 59 N.J. 241. 281
A.2d 513, 518 (1971) (prohibition of "group rentals" invalid as "sweepingly excessive"): Bristow v. City of Woodhaven. 35 Mich. App. 205. 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971)
(exclusion of mobile home parks invalid because of commitant exclusion of certain
element of residential dwellers); Gabe Collins Realty. Inc. v. City of Margate City.
112 N.J. Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1970) (restriction to no more than two
unrelated persons is arbitrary and unreasonable): Larson v. Mayor and Council of
Spring Lake Heights. 99 NJ. Super. 365, 240 A.2d 31 (L. Div. 1968) (total exclusion of "'unrelated" families goes beyond public need): National Land & Investment
Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1966) (4-acre minimum lot sizes does not
further public welfare); City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 III. 2d 432. 216 N.E.2d
116 (1966) (General Assembly had not authorized zoning restrictions against unrelated persons). Contra, Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan. 321 F. Supp. 908
(N.D. Cal. 1970) (restriction to no more thanfour unrelated individuals).
Less than a month before the Court heard oral argument in Boraas. the district
court in Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Wis. 1974), held unconstitutional a zoning ordinance which restricted "families" to no more than four unrelated
persons. The Court found the ordinance "not to be rationally related" to any legitimate governmental interest. Id. at 466.
80. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre. 367 F. Supp. 136, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
See Note. On Privacy, ConstitutionalProtectionfor PersonalLiberty, 48 N.Y.U-.L. REV.
670, 739 (1973):
To decide that alternative lifestyles are not protected by the right of privacy
would be to decide that no one has a right to pursue happiness in a way that is
alien to our traditions and thus to the Justices of the Supreme Court.
81.
Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806. 815 (2d Cir. 1973).
82. See Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241. 281 A.2d
513, 519 (1971).
83. 476 F.2d at 816. In cases upholding the fundamental interest of interstate
travel the Court seemed apprehensive of such exclusions. See Dunn v. Blumstein.
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income, or those passing muster after interview by a community "Admissions Committee."
84
Can retirement communities exclude everyone under 50 years of age,
or "swinger" communities exclude everyone over 50?85 A community's
majority should not be permitted to decide who will or will not be
admitted into a community. 86 Boraas potentially initiates the first step
toward an archipelagic society with dominant groups clustered within
87
specified boundaries.
More particularly, the broad sweep of Boraas represents a green
light for the proliferation of zoning ordinances which subtly discriminate against racial minorities and the poor.8 8 Such discrimination

405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Indeed, both decisions involved the fundamental interest of the right to travel, but this aspect is
conceivably the result rather than the reason. Both cases involved a state attempt to
exclude an undesirable class of citizens. Such action is no different than a town or
village enacting exclusionary policies, and the result is one class of citizens excluding
another. If the Court felt such action ran counter to the principles of "equality" basic
to the Constitution and our way of life, what better way to manifest this feeling than
to declare that the action infringed the fundamental right to travel? Yet, the sole,
although unarticulated, reason for this result was that the Court would not tolerate
one class of citizens excluding another. In other words, citizen-citizen exclusion may
be what violates the equal protection clause, not infringements on the right to travel.
84. Hinman v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 26 Conn. Supp. 125, 214 A.2d 131
(C.P. 1965). See Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 125 N.J. Super. 376, 311
A.2d 187 (App. Div. 1973). In Hinman the court held that the zoning commission
did not have authority to zone an area exclusively for persons 50 years of age
or older.
85. In Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Soc. v. Kansas City, 58 F.2d 593, 603
(8th Cir. 1932), the court struck down an ordinance which would have excluded a
home for the elderly from a single family residence zone: "[R] estricting ... districts
to particular classes of residents ... has been quite universally condemned .... "
86. In Nickola v. Township of Grand Blanc, 47 Mich. App. 684, 209 N.W.2d 803,
804 (1973), Judge O'Hara expressed the court's hope that zoning in Michigan is not
"a popularity contest to be won by the most organized and vocal of proponents or
opponents . . . [but] a set of legal principles embodied in some recognizable and
dependable case precedent." See Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205,
192 N.W.2d 322, 328 (1971); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215
A.2d 597, 611 (1965); Comment, The General Public Interest vs. The Presumption
of Zoning Ordinance Validity: A DebatableQuestion, 50 J. URB. LAW 129, 137 (1972).
87. In another context, the Court has commented that one state cannot "isolate
itself from difficulties common to all." Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173
(1941) (right to travel-exclusion of indigents). This same attitude was expressed
recently by the Michigan Court of Appeals in Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35
Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322, 328 (1971):
[S]trictly local interests of a municipality must yield if such conflict with the
overall state interests of the public at large ....
IA] balancing must be reached
between the effect of local considerations, concerns and desires against the greater
public interest.
88. The exclusion of indigents and minorities often run hand-in-hand, but ordinances effectuating such a result usually refrain from expressly stating that intent:
The methods used to achieve racial discrimination have become increasingly
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usually takes the form of "larger lot requirements, prohibition of multifamily units, and minimum floor area standards." 89 The short-range

effects of these restrictions are an increase in land acquisition and
construction costs, the discouragement of low income housing projects
and the inflation of rental rates and purchase prices beyond the means
of the lower income wage-earner. 90 Since these restrictions are incorporated into suburban zoning plans, the long-range result is that the
cities become surrounded by high-income residential areas. Thus, the
low and moderate income city-dweller is left with no alternative but to

remain in the deteriorating slums: 9 1
To continue present [land use] policies is to make permanent the division of our country into two societies; one, largely Negro and poor,
located in the central cities; the other, predominately white and affluent, located in the suburbs ....
Nearly any type of restriction based either directly or indirectly on
wealth would seem justified in terms of "family needs" and "family

values."
III.

CONCLUSION

When read in conjunction with the court of appeals decision, Boraas is a declination by the Court to clarify the standards of equal protection review. In Boraas the Court upheld the authority of communi-

subtle since the Civil Rights Act and the Fair Housing Act have declared racial
discrimination in public housing illegal. Through the use of zoning ordinances.
local authorities effectively exclude minority groups both racially and economically.
Comment, Exclusionary Land-Use Techniques: Judicial Response and Legislative
Initiative, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 388, 389 (1972). See also Comment, Exclusionary
Zoning and the Problem In Black Jack-A Denial of Housing To Whom?, 16 ST.
Louis U.L. REV. 294 (1971).
89. Comment, Discriminatory Zoning: Legal Battleground of the Seventies,
21 AMER. U.L. REV. 157 (1971).
90. Id. Thus, "the impact ... falls most heavily on racial minorities, since proportionately more blacks than whites are members of low- and moderate-income
families." Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra
and Dandridge, 81 YALE L.J. 61, 63 & n. 13 (1971).
91.
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 10 (1968).
Justice Marshall has described this phenomenon as the "white flight." Milliken v.
Bradley, 94 S. Ct. 3112, 3155 (1974) (dissenting opinion). A majority of the Court.
however, seems unwilling to take this factor into account: "[TIhe constitutional
principles applicable in school desegregation cases cannot vary in accordance with the
size or population dispersal of the particular city ....
."Id. at 3128-29 n.22.
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ties to restrict unrelated households, suggested that the freedom of
association is not fundamental in personal settings, and cut off the
right of privacy somewhere between decisions concerning contraception and abortions and the decision to live with whomever one
chooses. Although the holding in Boraas is very narrow, the Court's
attitude suggests that, to the chagrin of many libertarian commentators, 9 2 it is highly doubtful that exclusionary zoning will, in the near
future, be declared unconstitutional by the Court.
Albert G. Marquis

92.

See articles, comments and notes cited in Comment, Exclusionary Land-Use

Techniques: JudicialResponse and Legislative Initiative, 22 DEPAUL L. REv. 388, 389

n.4 (1972).
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